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1.  Introduction 
 
Crimea’s referendum for self-determination and Russia’s ensuing 
annexation completed on 21 March with the signature by President 
Vladimir Putin of two ad-hoc federal laws (the Federal Constitutional 
Law On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea 
and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent 
Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance 
Sevastopol, and the Federal Law On Ratifying the Agreement between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on Admitting to the 
Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the 
Russian Federation New Constituent Entities)1 has sparked a wave of 
international protest and accusations, especially by governments in 
West, that by doing so Russia was committing a grave violation of inter-
national law. Recurrent have been the claims by States and international 
organizations declaring that the alteration in status of Crimea shall nev-
er be recognised. In terms of legal consequences, non-recognition has 
∗ Associate Professor of International Law, University of Verona, Italy. 
1 Laws on admitting Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation (press re-
lease), <http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/6912> accessed 29 April 2014; Treaty between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the acceptance of the Republic of 
Crimea into the Russian Federation and on creation of new federative entities within the 
Russian Federation (unofficial translation) (18 March 2014), 
<www.academia.edu/6481091/A_treaty_on_accession_of_the_Republic_of_Crimea_an
d_Sebastopol_to_the_Russian_Federation._Unofficial_English_translation_with_little_
commentary> accessed 29 April 2014. 
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been one of the two international law ‘techniques’ (the other being the 
imposition of targeted sanctions) through which Russia’s annexation 
has been addressed. 
In the language and terminology employed by Western and Euro-
pean governments one can detect striking similarities with the wording 
used by the then US Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, in 1932 at the 
peak of the Manchurian crisis in the Far East, in which the US govern-
ment sent identical diplomatic notes to the Japanese and Chinese gov-
ernments declaring its refusal to recognize any de facto situation or trea-
ty impairing the treaty rights of China and the United States and the 
former’s territorial integrity or political independence. The so-called 
‘Stimson doctrine’ was seen as the first affirmation on the international 
plane of the principle of ex iniuria ius non oritur, i.e. of the principle of 
non-recognition of situations brought about through the illegal use of 
force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country and it 
gave rise to a concerted action of non-recognition within the League of 
Nations aiming at isolation the existing regime in Manchuria.2 In the 
United Nations era the doctrine of non-recognition has acquired an es-
tablished status under general international law, equally recognised by 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council, by the case of law of 
international tribunals and by the International law Commission (ILC), 
even if a considerable degree of uncertaintly remains over its foundation 
under positive law and over its precise scope of application. 
The present contribution examines the current non-recognition 
practice with regard to Crimea, in order to identify the legal significance 
of such practice under the three prevailing accounts and theories of 
non-recognition in international law, namely the normativist account, 
the ILC or ‘communitarian’ account and the ‘realist’ account. It also ex-
amines the scope of non-recognition obligations potentially accruing 
upon third States and international organizations. It concludes by an-
swering one question, namely which of the three doctrines of non-
recognition finds confirmation in the recent practice concerning Cri-
mea. 
2 Cited in R Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton University Press 1945) 58. On 
the Stimson doctrine see also W Meng, ‘Stimson Doctrine’ in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 
(1982) Vol IV 690; and D Turns, ‘The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition: its His-
torical Genesis and Influence on Contemporary International Law’ (2003) 2 Chinese J 
Intl L 105. 
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2. Non-recognition practice concerning the annexation of Crimea 
 
Non-recognition practice concerning the recent situation in Crimea 
has been quite significant, yet so far limited to the non-recognition of 
the referendum held on 16 March 2014 and of the ensuing annexation 
by Russia. At the present early stage, it has not extended to the avoid-
ance of implied forms of recognition. In this latter respect one may only 
mention reports concerning the decision of the the European Organisa-
tion for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), acting in coopera-
tion with the International Civil Aviation (ICAO) and the European 
Safety Aviation Authority (EASA), recommending to international op-
erators that they avoid flying into Crimean airports and through Crimea 
Airspace and not recognising the provision of air navigation services 
other than from Ukrainian official authorities.3 
As far as the non-recognition of the referendum and of Russia’s an-
nexation is concerned, the relevant practice is predominantly, but not 
exclusively, originating from Western countries and organizations. In a 
statement issued on 12 March 2014, the G-7 leaders have declared that   
 
‘[...] such referendum would have no legal effect. Given the lack of ad-
equate preparation and the intimidating presence of Russian troops, it 
would also be a deeply flawed process which would have no moral 
force. For all these reasons, we would not recognize the outcome.’4  
 
According to the joint statement issued by the President of European 
Commission, Josè Barroso, and the President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, on 16 March 2014 ‘the European Union consid-
ers the holding of the referendum on the future status of the territory of 
Ukraine as contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution and international 
law. The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not 
3 ‘European air traffic regulator suspends flights to Crimea’, 2 April 2014, 
<http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/726248>, accessed 29 April 2014. See ICAO State Let-
ter (2 April 2014) Doc. EUR/NAT 14-0243.TEC (FOL/CUP), 
<www.public.cfmu.eurocontrol.int/PUBPORTAL/gateway/spec/PORTAL.18.0.0.4.49/_res
/140243Simferopol.pdf>, accessed 2 May 2014. 
4 Statement of G-7 Leaders on Ukraine (12 March 2014), 
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/12/statement-g-7-leaders-ukraine>, ac-
cessed 29 April 2014. 
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be recognised.’5 On the same day and on a similar tone, the White 
House has declared that ‘[the] referendum is contrary to Ukraine’s con-
stitution, and the international community will not recognize the results 
of a poll administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a 
Russian military intervention that violates international law.’6 NATO’s 
Secretary-General, Anders Rasmussen, on 19 March, has stated that 
‘Crimea’s annexation is illegal and illegitimate and NATO Allies will 
not recognize it’.7  
At the level of the United Nations, the draft resolution concerning 
the referendum in Crimea and presented by 41 countries (predominant-
ly Western countries) for approval by the Security Council at the meet-
ing of 15 March was vetoed by Russia, with only China abstaining in the 
vote.8 The resolution reaffirmed in the preamble that ‘no acquisition of 
territory resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as 
legal’; it declared that the referendum could ‘not have legal validity’ and 
could ‘not form the basis for any alteration of the status of Crimea’; and 
it ‘call[ed] upon all States, international organizations and specialized 
agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of Crimea on the 
basis of this referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that 
might be interpreted as recognizing such altered status.’ During the 
meetings of the Security Council of 15 and 19 March calls for the non-
recognition of the results of the referendum and of the prospective an-
nexation by Russia were voiced by the delegations of France, the United 
Kingdom, Lithuania, Australia, Jordan, Ukraine and Luxembourg. 
On 24 March, the UN General Assembly has approved a draft reso-
lution proposed by Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Canada, Ukraine and 
Costa Rica, with 100 votes in favour, 11 against and 58 abstentions, ti-
5 Joint statement on Crimea by the President of the European Council, Herman 
Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso (16 
March 2014), <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/ 
2014/03/20140317_1_en.htm>, accessed 29 April 2014. 
6 White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Ukraine (16 March 2014), 
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/16/statement-press-secretary-ukraine>, 
accessed 29 April 2014. 
7 ‘NATO Secretary General condemns moves to incorporate Crimea into Russian 
Federation’, 18 March 2014, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108100.htm>, ac-
cessed 29 April 2014. 
8 UNSC Draft Resolution, UN Doc S/2014/189; UNSC Verbatim Record (15 
March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7138. 
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tled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’. Paras. 5 and 6 of the operative 
part of the resolution reiterate, in almost identical words, the determi-
nations made in the draft Security Council resolution vetoed by Russia a 
few days earlier; it includes the call for non-recognition of ‘any altera-
tion of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of the city 
of Sevastopol’ and to avoid ‘any action or dealing that might be inter-
preted as recognizing such altered status.’9 The delegations of the EU, 
Norway, Georgia, Turkey, Liechtenstein in their statements have ex-
pressely referred to the need for non-recognition of the outcome of the 
referendum and of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.10 
 
   
3.  Three theories of non-recognition in international law 
 
With respect to a policy of non-recognition adopted individually or 
collectively by States, such as is the case with Crimea, the following 
questions arise, and namely: whether non-recognition is mandatory un-
der international law; if that is the case, what is the legal basis of such 
obligation; and what is its precise scope of application. These questions 
are addressed (and answered) in different manners in three prevailing 
accounts of non-recognition under international law. 
 
a)  The ‘normativist’ approach to non-recognition 
 
The first approach we shall discuss is what we could refer to as the 
‘normativist’ approach. The main feature of the normativist approach is 
that non-recognition is a legal obligation stemming from the objective 
illegality and invalidity of a given situation created in violation of inter-
national law. We could also define such illegality and invalidity as ‘erga 
omnes’, in the sense that it is opposable to all international legal sub-
jects, which are under a duty not to recognize as lawful that situation. 
One can find expressions of that approach in the Namibia advisory 
opinion, in which the Court was asked by the Security Council to iden-
tify the legal consequences stemming from the latter’s adoption of reso-
lution 276, which inter alia declared South Africa’s continued presence 
9  UNGA Res 68/262 (24 March 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/262. 
10 UNGA Verbatim Record (24 March 2014) UN Doc A/68/PV.80. 
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in Namibia illegal and called upon States to refrain from any dealings 
with South Africa concerning Namibia.11 In examining the consequenc-
es for third States of the declaration of illegality of South Africa’s pres-
ence in Namibia, the Court relied on norms of general international law 
in order to precisely identify the obligations incumbent upon non-
member States of the UN – as such not bound by obligations imposed 
by the Security Council. According to the Court ‘the termination of the 
Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South Africa’s presence 
in Namibia [were] opposable to all States in the sense of barring erga 
omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of in-
ternational law […].’12 In the opinion, the Court also identified those 
relations which were incompatible with the determination of illegality 
made by UN political organs, such as entering into treaty relations, in-
voking and applying already existing treaty relations, exchanging dip-
lomatic or consular missions and entering into economic relations, in 
other words, any acts or dealings that could ‘imply recognition’ that the 
situation was legal.13 The Court also introduced an element of flexibility 
in the doctrine of non-recognition, by stating that ‘the non-recognition 
of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in the 
depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from inter-
national co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the 
Government of South Africa after the termination of the Mandate are 
illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such 
as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the ef-
fects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of 
the Territory.’14 We shall refer to this qualification made by the Court as 
the ‘Namibia exception’. 
The ‘normativist’ view is also supported by Judge Higgins separate 
opinion in the later advisory opinion Legality of the Wall in which the 
British judge criticized the Court’s decision to infer the obligation of 
non-recognition accruing upon third States with regard to the situation 
created by the construction of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian ter-
11 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South-Africa in Namib-
ia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16.  
12 ibid 55. 
13 ibid 56. 
14 ibid 55. 
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ritories from the erga omnes nature of the obligations breached. Ac-
cording to Judge Higgins ‘[t]hat an illegal situation is not to be recog-
nized or assisted by third parties is self-evident, requiring no invocation 
of the uncertain concept of ‘erga omnes’. It follows from a finding of an 
unlawful situation by the Security Council, in accordance with Articles 
24 and 25 of the Charter entails ‘decisions [that] are consequently bind-
ing on all States Members of the United Nations, which are thus under 
obligation to accept and carry them out’ (Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Afri-
ca) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 53, para 115). […] [T]he Court empha-
sized that ‘A binding determination made by a competent organ of the 
United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain 
without consequence.’ (Ibid., para 117.) […] Although in the present 
case it is the Court, rather than a United Nations organ acting under 
Articles 24 and 25, that has found the illegality; and although it is found 
in the context of an advisory opinion rather than in a contentious case, 
the Court’s position as the principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions suggests that the legal consequence for a finding that an act or sit-
uation is illegal is the same. The obligation upon United Nations Mem-
bers of non-recognition and non-assistance does not rest on the notion 
of erga omnes.’15 In sum, both the Namibia opinion and Judge Higgins’ 
separate opinion derive the erga omnes effect of the unlawful situation, 
hence the obligation of non-recognition accruing upon third parties, 
from the objective illegality and invalidity of the situation at hand as de-
termined by a UN organ. 
As impliedly recognised in Judge Higgins’ separate opinion, the 
main difficulty with espousing the latter view is that one has to rely on 
an authoritative determination at the level of the United Nations declar-
ing the objective illegality of the situation and calling upon States not to 
recognise the new situation as lawful, in order to avoid possibly conflict-
ing assessments made by third States. The legal consequences deriving 
from such a shortcoming of the theory at hand, which was propounded 
by Portugal in its contentious proceedings against Australia in the East 
Timor case, may be conspicuous; exactly due to that the Court in East 
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory (Advisory Opinion), Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, [2004] ICJ Rep 216. 
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Timor affirmed that ‘the argument of Portugal under consideration rests 
on the premise that the United Nations resolutions, and in particular 
those of the Security Council, can be read as imposing an obligation on 
States not to recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia over the 
Territory and, where the latter is concerned, to deal only with Portugal. 
The Court is not persuaded, however, that the relevant resolutions went 
so far.’16 Ultimately, the Court did not accept Portugal’s argument that 
the scope of the dispute with Australia could be limited to the latter’s 
compliance with obligations of non-recognition deriving from a number 
of resolutions adopted by the Security Council, exactly because those 
resolutions urged all parties to respect the right of self-determination of 
the people of East Timor, condemned Indonesia’s invasion, yet did not 
explicitly determine the illegality of the situation and require non-
recognition. In other words, a ‘triggering’ determination is necessary in 
order to render the duty operational. 
In the case of Crimea, as we have already seen, the Security Council 
was unable to approve a resolution declaring the situation as ‘illegal’ 
and calling upon member States not to recognize the results of the ref-
erendum organized by the Crimean authorities. Yet such a resolution 
was adopted by the General Assembly, the determination of which may 
be considered more authoritative and representative than that of the 
Security Council, in that the whole of the international community is 
there represented, had an opportunity to voice its views and to vote on 
the draft resolution.  
From the perspective of the source of legal obligation, one can first 
identify the principle of ex iniuria ius non oritur, hence making the obli-
gation as deriving from a general principle of law. The view was author-
itatively held by Hersch Lauterpacht in a famous passage of his classic 
book published in 1947, in which he held that ‘to admit that, apart from 
well-defined exceptions, an unlawful act, or its immediate consequenc-
es, may become suo vigore a source of legal right for the wrong-doer is 
to introduce into the legal system a contradiction which cannot be 
solved except by a denial of its legal character. International law does 
not and cannot form an exception to that imperative alternative.’17 The 
principle operates as a ‘trigger’ for non-recognition when it is applied in 
16 East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia) (Jurisdiction) [1995] ICJ Rep 103. 
17 H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (CUP 1947) 421. 
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relation to a legal claim to a certain status which is opposable erga om-
nes, such as in the case of an annexation or with regard to the claim to 
be considered the legitimate government of a country despite the estab-
lishment of a regime of apartheid.18 
But a further, possibly complementary, explanation is possible. And 
namely that the duty incumbent upon third parties may result from the 
erga omnes nature of certain subjective rights of State: in the case at 
hand, the right that Ukraine enjoys to see its territorial integrity respect-
ed, not only against forcible actions aimed at undermining it such as the 
Russian intervention in support of Crimea’s separatists, but also against 
other types of actions aiming at undermining its territorial integrity, 
such as recognition of the new status quo. That is clearly spelled out in 
the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations, which 
states that ‘[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of 
force shall be recognized as legal’.19 The same formula is also to be 
found in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1970.20 A similar formulation ap-
peared in the Definition of Aggression in 1974: ‘[n]o territorial acquisi-
tion or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recog-
nized as lawful.’21 
The same erga omnes characther is enjoyed by the right of self-
determination, as confirmed by the wording of common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of 
the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Economic Rights 
(ICESCR), which provides that ‘[t]he States Parties to the present Cov-
enant[s], including those having responsibility for the administration of 
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization 
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect the right, in con-
formity with the provisions of the Charter.’ In its General Comment 
No. 12 the Human Rights Committee has added that ‘[t]he obligations 
exist irrespective of whether a people entitled to self-determination de-
pends on a State party to the Covenant or not. It follows that all States 
18 M Dawidowicz, ‘The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation’ in 
J Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 
2010) 683. 
19 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970). 
20 UNGA Res 2734 (XXV) (16 December 1970) para 5. 
21 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) art 6 para 3. 
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parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate realiza-
tion of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination’.22 Fol-
lowing from that, one can explain the ‘erga omnes illegality’ of South 
Africa’s presence in Namibia as the resultant of a violation of the right 
of self-determination of the people of Nambia, which was opposable 
erga omnes. The violation of the subjective rights of the people of Na-
mibia was explicitly recognised by the Court where it held that ‘[…] all 
States should bear in mind that the injured entity is a people which must 
look to the international community for assistance in its progress to-
wards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted’ (emphasis 
added).23 
The main problem with identifying the legal basis in primary rules 
of conduct is that it is unclear whether implied forms of recognition 
come under the purview of the primary norms prohibiting explicit, 
formal recognition: by resorting to a restrictive, textual interpretation of 
those obligations, a State may argue that allowing commercial relations 
with an annexed territory does not enter into conflict with its duty to 
withold recognition of the annexation as ‘legal’; or with its duty to facili-
tate the realization of the right of self-determination of a people which 
has been subjected to foreign occupation. An analysis of the travaux 
preparatoires of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the duty 
of non-recognition of territorial acquisitions resulting from the use of 
force shows that the addition of the qualification ‘as legal’ or ‘as lawful’ 
was exactly intended to address the preoccupations of Western coun-
tries keen to avoid a regulation that would preclude de facto contacts 
and relations with illegal regimes.24 A comprehensive theory of non-
recognition is better accommodated by relying on the principle of ex 
iniuria ius non oritur, which may create a presumption against any form 
22 UNCHR, ‘General Comment no. 12: The Right to Self-determination of Peoples’ 
in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recom-
mendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (13 March 1984) para 6. 
23 Namibia (n 11) 56. 
24 S Talmon, ‘The Duty Not to “Recognize as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Il-
legal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation 
without Real Substance?’ in C Tomuschat and JM Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental 
Rules of the International of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations 
Erga Omnes Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 99. 
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of recognition of the illegal regime, save for the specific circumstances 
falling under the ‘Namibia exception’. 
 
b)  The ‘communitarian’ approach to non-recognition 
 
The second approach is that codified by the ILC at Articles 40 and 
41 of the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts and it may be better described as ‘communitarian’ ac-
cording to its content and rationale. A duty of non-recognition shall 
arise when the situation is the result of a ‘gross violation of obligations 
deriving from a peremptory norm’ of international law.25 Replacing the 
previous idea of setting up a special regime for international crimes and 
of relying on the concept of erga omnes obligations,26 the ILC in the 
2001 draft articles decided to introduce the notion of ‘serious violations 
of peremptory norms of international law’ in order to spell out an ag-
gravated regime of State responsibility. Among the consequences of the 
responsibility arising out of grave breaches of peremptory norms, for 
example the prohibition of aggression or the obligation to respect the 
rights of self-determination of peoples, Article 41(2) provides for the 
obligation for States not to ‘recognize as lawful a situation created by a 
serious violation’ of a peremptory norm, together with the additional 
obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.27 
To that extent, the duty of non-recognition arises not only from the na-
ture of the obligation breached – it must be an infringement of an obli-
gation arising out of a norm of ius cogens – but such violation must be 
of a serious nature, i.e. to use the ILC articles’ wording a ‘gross and sys-
tematic failure to fulfil the obligation’.28 The ILC approach sees the du-
ty of non-recognition as a communitarian countermeasure to react to 
the most egregious breaches of norms of a fundamental nature and to 
25 Articles 40 and 41, 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility with Commentary, 
in Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-third Session UN Doc A/56/10 
277-292. 
26 For a critical appraisal of the choice to abandon the concept of erga omnes obli-
gations, in order to espouse that of ius cogens, see P Picone, ‘The Distinction Between 
Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Obligations’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The Vienna Convention 
Beyond the Law of the Treaties (OUP 2011). 
27 ILC Articles on State Responsibility with Commentary (n 25). 
28 ibid. 
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bring to an end the illegal situation resulting therefrom. As a matter of 
fact the duty of non-recognition is part of a broad array of community 
measures aimed at restoring the status quo ante: Article 41(1) provides 
for a positive duty of all States to co-operate to bring to an end through 
lawful means any Article 40 situation; the second part of Article 41(2) 
provides for a further duty to abstain from rendering any form of aid or 
assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation.29 
The latter approach has two advantages as compared with the for-
mer. Firstly, it differentiates between violations in general — which may 
be either minor or may not fall under the purview of a ius cogens norm 
or erga omnes obligation — and violations that because of their gravity 
and because of the ‘public interest’ underlying the affected norms re-
quire a coordinated effort by the international community in rendering 
ineffective the results deriving from the violation of international law. In 
this sense, it is a secondary obligation applying regardless of the specific 
content of the primary norm which has been violated; and it is less reli-
ant on the position of the injured State, whose waiver or recognition 
‘cannot preclude the international community interest in ensuring a just 
and appropriate settlement’.30 The second one is that it builds on a 
practice of States and international organizations that sees non-
recognition as a reaction to the most significant violations of fundamen-
tal rules protecting the interests of the international community and as a 
necessary tool the international community has developed in order to 
deny legal effectiveness to a de facto situation. It is also confirmed, even 
if with different conceptual tools, by the ICJ in the Wall advisory opin-
ion. 
In the opinion, the Court held that, in view of the erga omnes char-
acter of the obligations breached by Israel — namely those related to 
the self-determination of the Palestinian people and their protection 
under international humanitarian law — through the construction of 
the wall in the West Bank and in and around East Jerusalem, States are 
under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation.31 According to 
the Court, it is thus the nature of the obligations breached that makes 
29 On the relationship among the three different obligations see Legality of the Wall 
(n 15) Separate Opinions of Judge Higgins and Judge Kooijmans. 
30 ILC Articles on State Responsibility with Commentary (n 25) 289-290. 
31 Legality of the Wall (n 15) 200. 
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non-recognition by other States obligatory in terms of international law. 
While one may share the employment by the ICJ of a different concep-
tual toolbox as compared to the ILC, and yet wonder over the real mo-
tivations behind that choice, the duty of non-recognition is also con-
ceived as a communitarian countermeasure to repair the consequences 
of a breach of a norm so fundamental for the international community. 
This approach should not be confused with the concept of ‘erga omnes’ 
employed by the same Court in Namibia, as in that case the term only 
indicated the effect of the illegality determined by the UN political or-
gans with regard to the violation of certain rights belonging to the peo-
ple of Namibia — namely opposable erga omnes —, not the quality of 
the obligation breached as protecting an interest of the international 
community as a whole. 
The problem of the impartial, third-party, ‘triggering’ determination 
identified with the normativist approach remains with the ‘communitar-
ian’ approach. In order for the obligation to become truly operational, 
one must at least rely on an authoritative determination made at the lev-
el of the United Nations, be it the Security Council, the General As-
sembly or the International Court of Justice. These procedural aspects, 
which pertain to the coordination of States as ‘care-takers’ of the inter-
national community, are most prominent for their absence in the ILC 
draft articles. Despite the ‘blatant’, ‘manifest’ nature of the violations of 
international law involved in the ILC approach and the fact that the ICJ 
propounds a theory based on the nature of the obligations breached 
which may warrant an active role of all States and international organi-
zations as guardians of international legality, it is a fact that egregious 
violations of peremptory norms have managed to even escape the retho-
ric of non-recognition, when put into motion by powerful actors: one 
can mention both the Kosovo and Iraq examples, where the Security 
Council and parts of the international community have endeavored to 
recognise, rather than non-recognise the status quo produced by blatant 
violations of Article 2, para 4, of the UN Charter.32 In other cases, the 
ambiguities of authoritative determinations, such as those concerning 
East Timor and Western Sahara, have provided sufficient room for 
32 E Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law (Brill 2006) 190-
265. 
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manouevre for international actors wishing to impliedly recognise the 
legal authority of wrongdoers over those territories.33 
Moreover, if we were to identify the precise legal basis of the ILC 
approach, one is left halfway between a customary rule, with an incon-
sistent practice not satisfying the requirements of generality and uni-
formity if we except territorial acquisitions by force and apartheid re-
gimes, and a selective application of the general principle of ex iniuria 
ius non oritur. Given that the net result is almost overlapping with the 
‘normativist’ explanation in that not much is left in terms of practice in-
voked in the commentary beyond instances of practice concerning acts of 
aggression or forcible denial of self-determination through apartheid, one 
is left wondering whether the difference between the two approaches is 
limited to the emphasis of the ILC and ICJ approach to the communitar-
ian nature of the reaction, rather than on the subjective rights of the in-
jured subject; and whether the ILC distinction between primary and sec-
ondary norms is in this specific respect analitically helpful.  
Be that as it may, in the case of Crimea, the link between non-
recognition and the violation of erga omnes obligations is impliedly rec-
ognised in the preamble of General Assembly resolution 68/262, where 
specific mention is made of Article 2 of the UN Charter and of the duty 
of States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of other States; despite the absence 
of any determination concerning Russia’s responsibility for military ac-
tion or its act of annexation. Or in the statement of 12 March of the G-7 
leaders, in which it is declared that ‘[i]n addition to its impact on the 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the annexation of 
Crimea could have grave implications for the legal order that protects the 
unity and sovereignty of all states. Should the Russian Federation take 
such a step, we will take further action, individually and collectively’.34 
 
 
 
33 East Timor (n 16) 104; Council Decision of 16 December 2013 on the conclusion, 
on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union and the 
Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution 
provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and 
the Kingdom of Morocco OJ L 349 1. 
34 Statement of G-7 Leaders on Ukraine (n 4), emphasis added. 
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c)  Non-recognition as a sanction 
 
A third stream has conceived non-recognition as a sanction. In a le-
gal system, such as the international one, lacking procedural mecha-
nisms of authoritative, impartial and legally binding determinations, one 
is left with the different reactions of States and international organiza-
tions to wrongful acts. Hence, non-recognition should be construed as a 
social sanction aiming at the isolation of the wrongdoer, that interna-
tional actors undertake in order to induce a cessation of the illegal con-
duct. In other words, in a decentralized legal system such as interna-
tional law one can hardly envisage a form of ‘objectively’ illegal or inva-
lid situation. The illegality is determined and enforced by each and eve-
ry State, individually or collectively through international organizations, 
which may decide to sanction such illegality inter alia by deciding not to 
recognise any legal effects deriving from that situation. 
Under one version of the latter theory non-recognition as such is not 
mandatory under any rule of international law; it is simply the result of 
the free choice of the State or a group of States. Of course, a policy of 
non-recognition may be adopted by the Security Council and, if sanc-
tioned through recourse to its Ch. VII powers, the policy may become 
binding upon States. As a matter of fact, Article 41 of the UN Charter 
itself, that is the provision that together with Article 25 may provide the 
legal basis for the adoption of such kind of measures, exemplifies the 
measures not involving the use of force that the Security Council may 
decide with specific reference to a wrongdoing State, by referring to the 
severance of diplomatic and economic relations: non-recognition is one 
of the tools in order to achieve the international isolation of wrongdoing 
State. The present approach was held by the Australian government in 
the East Timor proceedings before the ICJ: ‘Australia denies that States 
are under an automatic obligation under general international law not 
to recognise or deal with a State which controls and administers a terri-
tory whose people are entitled to self-determination. There is no auto-
matic obligation of non-recognition or non-dealing, even though that 
State may be denying the people the right to self-determination.’35 Some 
35 CR 95/14, 16 February 1995 at 36, para 5 (James Crawford), <www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/84/5327.pdf>, accessed 29 April 2014. See also A Pert ‘The “Duty” 
of Non-Recognition in Contemporary International Law: Issues and Uncertainties’ 
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years earlier, the Australian government had declared the following 
with regard to Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor: ‘This is a reality 
with which we must come to terms. Accordingly, the Government has 
decided that although it remains critical of the means by which integra-
tion was brought about it would be unrealistic to continue to refuse to 
recognize de facto that East Timor is part of Indonesia.’36 Australia’s 
views were upheld by the ICJ in its decision on jurisdiction, where it 
was impliedly held that an obligation of non-recognition could not be 
deduced by Security Council resolutions in the absence of a clear lan-
guage to that effect (and hence impliedly affirming that such obligations 
could not derive from general international law).37 
Other authors, on the other hand, while construing non-recognition 
of grave violations of peremptory norms as mandatory under general 
international law as a result of the operation of the principle of ex ini-
uria ius non oritur maintain that non-recognition is not a consequence 
of the objective illegality and invalidity of the situation, but the means 
by which such illegality and invalidity is sanctioned and enforced.38  
The present approach(es) to non-recognition may be labelled as ‘re-
alist’, in the sense that it is apparently faithful to the realities of interna-
tional law. An obligation of non-recognition may accrue for third par-
ties only as a result of obligations clearly imposed by primary rules: 
hence an obligation of non-recognition may accrue upon a third party 
as a result of a binding Security Council resolution; or, with regard to a 
secessionist entity, by a primary obligation not to proceed to premature 
recognition in the absence of an established and effective governmental 
organization, which has deprived the central government of control and 
authority over a certain part of its territory. Reactive measures are better 
[2014] Chinese (Taiwan) YB Intl L and Affairs (forthcoming), <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2368618>, accessed 29 April 2014. Australia’s position on 
non-recognition, together with the practice originating from other States concerning 
unrecognised entities, is described in ILA Committee Recognition/Non-Recognition 
Second (Interim) Report (2014), <www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/ 
1032>, accessed 2 May 2014.  
36 Quoted in O Dörr, Kompendium völkerrechtlichen Rechtsbesprechungen (Mohr 
Siebeck 2004) 593. 
37 East Timor (n 16) 104. 
38 E.g. A Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States through 
Secession’, in M Kohen (ed), Secession: International Law Perspectives (CUP 2006) 199-
207. 
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described as ‘sanctions’, which may take the form of third-party coun-
termeasures in cases of grave breaches of fundamental principles of in-
ternational law (a controversial possibility under the ILC law of State 
responsibility).39 Yet the theory does not account for the fact that in 
most of the cases in which an unlawful situation has received none or 
scanty recognition, that has been often the result of determinations 
made by the Security Council and of hortatory measures, which did not 
fall under umbrella of Ch. VII.40 
If we apply the ‘realist’ theory to the Crimean situation, we see that 
non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation remains a discretionary sanc-
tion; no obligation is imposed by General Assembly resolution 68/262; 
even the Security Council draft resolution vetoed by Russia on 15 
March would not have made non-recognition clearly mandatory in that 
it was adopted in the effort to facilitate a peaceful solution of the dis-
pute and it was clearly an act adopted under Ch. VI of the Charter. 
 
 
4.  Scope of non-recognition: possible measures to be adopted with regard 
to Crimea 
 
A comprehensive approach to non-recognition is not limited to the 
formal recognition of the legality of the situation as such, such as an act 
of annexation, but it also extends to all relations, of an economic, politi-
cal, diplomatic, commercial nature which imply recognition of the ille-
gal situation. In broad terms, and with regard to the application of the 
doctrine of non-recognition to the situation in Crimea, States and inter-
national organizations shall refrain from any formal act of recognition of 
Russia’s legal authority over Crimea and from any act which implies 
recognition of such authority. That is confirmed by para 6 of GA Res 
68/262, which calls upon States, international organizations and special-
ized agencies ‘to refrain from any action or dealing that might be inter-
preted as recognizing any [...] altered status [of Crimea].’    
Yet implied recognition is the ambit of the doctrine(s) of non-
recognition where most uncertainty remains and where the gap between 
normative principles and the actual practice of States remains wide. The 
39 ILC Articles on State Responsibility with Commentary (n 25) 349. 
40 Dawidowickz (n 18) 693. 
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recent practice of the EU entering into fisheries agreements with Mo-
rocco extending to the waters off the coast of Western Sahara shows 
exactly that.41 As examples concerning the situation in Crimea, one may 
mention non-recognition measures and stances which would implement 
a policy of non-recognition, which also avoids implied forms of recogni-
tion. Namely: a) ensure that Russian-badged exports from Crimea (or 
circumvented elsewhere) do not benefit from preferential Ukrainian 
trade tariffs and are prevented from entering national markets, includ-
ing the EU market; b) adopt legislation preventing exports into Crimea 
if Russia was to impose Eurasian Customs Union regulatory require-
ments; c) ensure that visa application processes continue to respect 
Ukrainian sovereignty, by simply continuing to follow pre-annexation 
rules; d) refuse recognition of Russian passports issued in Crimea after 
the date of annexation; e) refuse recognition under international law of 
Russia’s claims to the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone off 
the coast of Crimea; f) refuse to negotiate new agreements and apply ex-
isting ones with Russia including Crimea in their territorial scope of ap-
plication. If we adopt the stance that non-recognition stems from a sec-
ondary obligation or from the application in international law of the 
principle ex iniuria ius non oritur and it extends to implied forms of 
recognition, all these measures seem mandatory under international law. 
At any rate, limited exceptions would apply, especially with a view to 
ensuring respect for the human rights of the local population; they may 
normally extend to the recognition of acts of the local authorities, such 
as the registration of births and marriages, and to local judicial remedies 
for the purpose of protecting the rights of individuals.42 
Yet a coherent and comprehensive policy of non-recognition may 
require further positive action by States. For instance, States should 
take appropriate measures to ensure that Crimean goods cannot access 
their market through Russia, by requiring that Russian authorities pro-
vide negative certification guaranteeing that goods are not partly or 
wholly sourced from Crimea. In the case of Russia’s failure to provide 
such certification, States may decide to apply targeted restrictions on 
certain categories of goods that have a high risk of originating from 
41 Council Decision of 16 December 2013 (n 33). 
42 Case of Cyprus v. Turkey (Merits), European Court of Human Rights, Series A, 
No 4, 5 (10 May 2001). 
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Crimea. Moreover, States may adopt guidelines for national companies 
on the legal implications of operating and/or investing in Crimea - in-
cluding the legality of transactions with businesses that own or make 
use of assets expropriated by the Russian authorities or Crimean author-
ities. They may also actively discourage their own nationals from visiting 
Crimea, through travel advice notices recommending against all/but es-
sential travel and warning of the lack of consular assistance in Crimea. 
All these examples, on the other hand, imply positive actions by the 
States, which are discretionary in nature even under the ‘legal’ theories 
of non-recognition. As a matter of fact, positive actions may result in 
proper sanctions: one can think of the possibility for States and interna-
tional organizations of imposing asset freezes, travel and export bans on 
those Russian or Crimean individuals that have benefitted from the ille-
gal expropriation of Ukrainian owned assets, including infrastructure, 
in Crimea. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion: answering the question 
 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has met the firm protest of significant 
parts of the international community and it has led the General Assem-
bly to call upon States and international organizations not to recognise 
any change in the status of Crimea. The call has been matched by the 
decisions of certain sectors of international community to impose sanc-
tions against certain entities and individuals which have promoted and 
benefitted from the separation of Crimea from Ukraine.43 The non-
recognition practice just mentioned has surely reinforced non-
recognition as a reactive measure to grave violations of fundamental le-
gal principles regulating the relations among States. Yet one fundamen-
tal question remains unanswered: which of the three doctrines of non-
recognition is better reflected in the current practice concerning Cri-
mea? 
43 Travel restrictions and the freeze of assets have been decided by the US administra-
tion and by the EU against public officials, representatives and entities in Crimea and Rus-
sia. For the latest sanctions imposed by the EU see Council Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 433/2014 of 28 April 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 con-
cerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine OJ L 126 48.  
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The question does not prompt an easy, straight answer. The recur-
rent invocation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and of 
the inacceptability of territorial annexations, sometimes in connection 
with the affirmation of a non-recognition policy, may indicate a rein-
forcement of the ‘normativist’ paradigm, especially if we emphasise 
non-recognition as a primary obligation related to the prohibition of 
aggression and annexation. The invocation of the legal principle of ter-
ritorial integrity and of the need to respect the principles of internation-
al law embodied in the UN Charter has been general and widespread, 
even among those countries that due to political reservations have de-
cided to abstain in the vote before the General Assembly. On the other 
hand, the communitarian paradigm is most prominent in the determina-
tions made by international organizations and States: as a further exam-
ple, one may recall the US statement to the effect that ‘[i]n this century, 
we are long past the days when the international community will stand 
quietly by while one country forcibly seizes the territory of another. We 
call on all members of the international community to continue to con-
demn such actions, to take concrete steps to impose costs, and to stand 
together in support of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.’44 Finally, non-recognition can be seen as the 
‘de minimis’ measure, in a broad array of tools, parts of the international 
community have adopted against Russia and Crimea’s authorities, in 
order to bring to an end the illegal situation through the imposition of 
political and economic ‘costs’ to Russia’s adventurism. To that extent, 
the sanctions paradigm is also present in the practice we have analysed, 
especially if we look at the practice of Western countries, which have 
been most vocal in invoking a policy of non-recognition. Ultimately, the 
affirmation of a policy and a duty of non-recognition which reveals all 
three dimensions underlying the three doctrines of non-recognition is a 
sign that international law, at least at the very beginning of a situation 
produced by a grave violation of its fundamental norms, endeavours to 
exercise the three functions, which, in turn, underlie the three doc-
trines: the protection of subjective rights of the injured party; the affir-
mation of a community interest in the protection of fundamental norms; 
and the need to enforce the legal norms which are being breached. In 
sum, in a functional perspective, the relation among the three ap-
44 White House (n 6). 
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proaches may be better described as one of complementarity, rather 
than mutual exclusion. 
That leads to a further question (which will remain unanswered, at 
least for the time being): will the achievement of these three objectives 
be undermined by the passing of time, by the normative Kraft des Fak-
tischen in the long run, by the gradual, creeping acceptance and acqui-
escence to the status quo of Russia’s annexation? That remains the main 
and enduring challenge to the doctrine(s) of non-recognition and one 
that none of the theories presented can easily dispose of. 
  
 
 
 
